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The antitrust cases against Microsoft in the United States and
Europe have been the most high profile implementation of
competition law in the last 20 years. Christos Genakos, Kai Uwe
Kühn and John Van Reenen look at the key economic issues,
notably what they imply for the conduct of competition policy in
high-tech industries dominated by rapid innovation.
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I
n the various Microsoft cases,
antitrust authorities in the United
States and the European Union
(EU) took on one of the most
valuable companies in the world
and its CEO Bill Gates, the world’s richest
man. After five years of investigation, in
March 2004, the European Commission
held Microsoft guilty of abuse of its
dominant market position under Article 82
of EU law and imposed the largest fine
ever for such an antitrust violation in
Europe: €497 million. 
The Commission found that Microsoft
had abused its monopoly of personal
computer (PC) operating systems in two
ways: ‘deliberately restricting
interoperability between Windows PCs
and non-Microsoft work group servers,
and by tying its Windows Media Player, a
product where it faced competition, with
its ubiquitous Windows operating system.’
(Work group servers are computers that
allow people to share files and printing,
store and protect large amounts of data,
access the internet, etc.)
The Commission also demanded major
remedies, including compulsory licensing
of intellectual property: ‘within 120 days,
to disclose complete and accurate
interface documentation which would
allow non-Microsoft work group servers to
achieve full interoperability with Windows
PCs and servers’; and ‘within 90 days, to
offer to PC manufacturers a version of its
Windows client PC operating system
without Windows Media Player.’ 
This degree of intervention is highly
unusual and has led to a continued
conflict about the implementation of the
remedies. The case also raises an
important question about the conduct of
competition policy in high-tech industries
dominated by rapid innovation.
Market power
In the server case, which we focus on
here, the Commission’s basic argument
was that Microsoft extended its market
power from PC operating systems (of
which Windows controls over 95% of the
market) into a complementary market –
that of the operating systems for work
group servers. How did it do this?
For server operating systems to be
effective, they must be able to
communicate easily with the PC operating
system – what is known as ‘efficient
interoperability’. Microsoft’s control of the
PC operating system meant that it could
limit the efficient interoperability between
Windows and rival companies’ server
operating systems by manipulating the
interfaces responsible for connecting
Windows with other software. 
The Commission argued that Microsoft
had both short-run (‘static’) and long-run
(‘dynamic’) incentives to ‘foreclose’ rivals
from the server operating systems market
in this way. The dynamic reasons are
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probably most important, as Microsoft was
clearly concerned that a strong presence
of rivals in server operating systems could
threaten the profits it enjoyed from its
Windows monopoly of the PC market in
the future.
For example, customers could reduce
their reliance on PCs by running
applications like spreadsheets, database
management and banking software mostly
on servers, leading to a decline of
Microsoft’s longstanding monopoly. By
extending the Windows platform
dominance from PCs to servers, Microsoft
could extinguish this future threat.
Various internal emails by Microsoft
senior executives suggest that this strategy
was not the overzealous imaginings of
Eurocrats. For example, in 1997, Bill Gates
wrote: ‘What we’re trying to do is use our
server control to do new protocols and
lock out Sun and Oracle specifically… the
symmetry that we have between the client
operating system and the server operating
system is a huge advantage for us’.
This may have just been cheap talk,
but as Figure 1 shows, Microsoft’s share of
the server operating systems market did
rise dramatically during the late 1990s:
from about 20% at the start of 1996 to
over 60% in 2001. By this point, Novell,
the combined UNIX platforms (IBM, 
Sun, etc.) and Linux could muster only
about 10% each in market shares. The
Commission argued that at least some of
Microsoft’s swift rise to power was due to
anti-competitive actions.
There has been much debate over
whether Microsoft was dominant in the
work group server market. But the key
issue in a ‘leveraging’ case like this is
whether Microsoft had power over PC
operating systems. Given their 95%-plus
market share, even Microsoft’s lawyers did
not try hard to contest this point.
Economic incentives to
foreclose
So did Microsoft have an economic
incentive to foreclose competition through
leveraging? The key question is as follows:
when firm A, the monopolist (Microsoft in
PC operating systems), faces firm B in a
complementary market (server operating
systems), in what circumstances will firm A
exclude firm B from the adjacent market?
Microsoft’s essential argument rested on
the Chicago School view that a
monopolist does not have incentives to
monopolise a complementary market since
all profits can be extracted at least as
effectively by increasing the price of the
monopoly product. 
The Chicago argument – known as the
‘one monopoly profit theory’ – is that
degrading interoperability would cost
Microsoft lost revenues as consumers would
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not be willing to pay as much for a
Windows operating system due to its lower
performance with non-Microsoft servers.
Instead of going to the expense of
monopolising the new market through
reducing rivals’ quality, Microsoft could
simply charge a higher price for its PC
operating system and extract all the profits
from the server market in this way.
Consequently, the Chicago argument is that
Microsoft must have benign reasons, such
as its desire to end the excessive profits
earned by other server vendors or the
superior efficiency of Windows technology.
The modern economic theory of
foreclosure suggests many reasons why
this critique might break down. In
Microsoft’s case, it is useful to distinguish
between dynamic and static incentives.
Dynamic incentives to
foreclose
The lack of any long-run incentive to
foreclose in the ‘one monopoly profit
theory’ arises from the assumption that
the monopolist has a permanent
unchallenged position with no threat of
future entry to the primary market. This is
unlikely to hold for Microsoft’s position in
the PC operating systems market.
Although in the short run it was
protected by strong barriers to entry, in
the longer run, there were a variety of
threats to Microsoft’s juicy stream of
profits. Consumers care about the
software applications (spreadsheets, word
processors, games, etc) that are written on
a particular operating system. The main
competitive advantage of Windows is the
wide range of applications written on its
platform (software developers write
programs to work on the most popular
platforms). But major platform threats
emerged in the late 1990s associated with
the growth of the internet.
One threat was that increasing
numbers of applications could be delivered
through servers. Server operating systems
Figure 1:
The growth of Microsoft’s share in the work group server
market 1996-2001
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By degrading the ability
of rival server operating
systems to work with
Windows, Microsoft
‘foreclosed’ the market
The Commission's
remedy for foreclosure
was to ask Microsoft to
reveal information to
enable server vendors
to connect properly
with Windows
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typically run on open standards, so
software developers could use these
standards rather than Windows. This
meant that the server operating system
could become a potential non-Microsoft
platform, directly challenging the
stronghold that Microsoft had created on
PC operating systems. If applications only
needed a slimmed down version of a PC
operating system, customers would not
need to buy expensive Windows
upgrades.
Effectively, a platform based on a
server operating system could have
become a potential competitor for the
Windows operating system. One way to
prevent this danger was for Microsoft to
monopolise the server market – even if this
meant sacrificing profits in the short run.
The key idea in dynamic foreclosure
theory is that an action that shifts short-
run market share can have long-run
benefits to the monopolist through
depressing rivals’ incentives to invest and
innovate. In many cases, these arguments
may be suspect as there is no obvious
mechanism whereby this could take place.
But in Microsoft’s case, the mechanism is
clear and well established due to the
‘applications network effect’. Shifts in
share towards Microsoft in the server
market (current and expected) will mean
that developers start switching away from
writing to non-Microsoft platforms.
Customers will shift away from rivals
because there are fewer applications and
this will further reduce developer’s
incentives to write software. This
applications network effect makes
foreclosure arguments much more
plausible than in other industries.
Static incentives to foreclose
The dynamic arguments for foreclosure
work even though, in the short run, the
monopolist may suffer some losses. But
these arguments are even more
compelling when there are short-run
incentives to foreclose. One such incentive
is the ability to price discriminate more
effectively in the monopoly market 
(PC operating systems) by dominating 
the complementary market (server
operating systems). 
In Microsoft’s case, imagine that there
are two types of customers: large firms
(which are less sensitive to the price of the
PC operating system) and small firms
(which are very sensitive to the price of
the PC operating system). A monopolist
would like to charge a high price to the
large firms and a low price to the small
firms. Microsoft finds this hard to do
because the large firm can always pretend
to be a small firm.
But imagine that large firms also place
a high valuation on a complementary
product (servers), whereas small firms do
not because the gains from sharing
computing resources are much smaller. In
this case, by monopolising the server
market and charging a higher price for the
PC and server operating systems bundle,
Microsoft is able to extract more profits.
Our research provides empirical evidence
that these short-run incentives exist and
that they have grown stronger over time. 
Remedies
Software markets are fast moving and
highly innovative: many new economy
advocates have argued that European
competition law is inadequate in such
markets. In particular, Microsoft argued
that the proposed remedies of forced
disclosure of interoperability information
would have a severely negative effect on
innovation, as it would lead to the
wholesale cloning of Microsoft’s valuable
intellectual property. Whatever the
supposed short-run gains, they argued
that the long-run costs in terms of lower
innovation by Microsoft would swamp
these purported benefits.
These are difficult areas as the
Commission was under no legal obligation
to consider the effects on innovation,
despite their economic importance.
Nevertheless, the Commission argued
that: ‘a detailed examination of the scope
of the disclosure at stake leads to the
conclusion that, on balance, the possible
negative impact on Microsoft’s incentives
to innovate is outweighed by its positive
impact on the level of innovation of the
whole industry’.
To assess this claim, we must
investigate the Commission’s remedies and
their likely impact on innovation incentives
on Microsoft, on its rivals and therefore on
the market as a whole. The Commission
asked Microsoft to reveal information
necessary to allow rivals to interoperate
with the Windows platform. This amounts
to a compulsory licensing remedy. The
Commission conceded that Microsoft
could charge a reasonable fee for such
licenses, reflecting the intellectual property
embedded in the information.
There is an important distinction
between demanding information to
enable interoperability compared with
imitation. The Commission wants the
former to enable other firms to connect
to Windows in the same way telecom
There are many reasons
for believing that the
remedy could have a
positive effect on
industry-wide innovation
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regulators force fixed line incumbents to
share their network with mobile phone
operators, even if the incumbent also
offers these services.
If the remedy allowed imitation – for
example, a complete copy of the key
security features of the PC operating
system – there would be a stronger
concern over innovation. Consequently,
the remedy did not require release of
Windows source code – Microsoft’s 
‘crown jewels’. 
Interestingly, Windows source code is
not what the rival server vendors
wanted. Instead, they were after a
detailed technical description of the
interfaces to enable them to design 
their own code to interoperate with
Windows. Microsoft’s description of 
the remedy as allowing cloning is
therefore inaccurate. 
The impact on innovation
incentives
What are the likely effects of the remedy
on industry incentives to invest in
research and development (R&D)? For
Microsoft’s rivals, there are two effects:
■ Having interoperability information
increases the value and sales of their
products. This will increase rivals’ returns
to R&D, as any innovation will be spread
over a larger number of units sold. The
remedy essentially reduces Microsoft’s
tax on rival innovation and should
increase incentives to innovate.
■ Rivals no longer have to incur costs to
overcome technical barriers to
interoperability created by Microsoft’s
disclosure policy. Overcoming such
barriers is innovation of a sort, but it is
duplicative and socially wasteful.
There are several potential effects 
of the remedy on Microsoft’s incentives 
to innovate:
■ First, with better disclosure, rivals will be
able to compete on a level playing field.
To the extent that this reduces the
expected market share and increases
price competition from now higher
quality rival products, the remedy may
lead to some reduction in Microsoft’s
incentive to invest. But unlike its rivals,
Microsoft will still obtain substantial
profits from general innovation in the PC
operating systems market, where it will
continue to enjoy a monopoly. There is
therefore little reason to expect that
Microsoft’s incentives to innovate on
operating systems solutions would
substantially fall.
■ A further effect may also contribute
strongly to increased innovation
incentives. Through innovation, a firm
can escape harsh competition with rivals
and secure profits for a transitory period.
This effect will tend to increase the
investment incentives of all firms,
including Microsoft. Economic research
is somewhat ambiguous on the net
impact of all of these effects, but on
balance, it is believed that intensifying
competition will usually lead to increased
innovation.
■ Finally, Microsoft may change the quality
as well as the quantity of its R&D. There
could be positive effects on quality
because Microsoft will no longer have
incentives to block innovations that raise
quality but have high interoperability
with non-Microsoft servers. There is
some evidence that Microsoft has
sacrificed its own innovative potential to
protect the Windows desktop monopoly.
This was known within Microsoft as the
Windows ‘strategy tax’ – the need 
to close down research lines that,
although leading to innovative 
products, could potentially weaken the
lock-in of Windows. 
In summary, there are likely to be
positive effects on rivals’ innovation from
the remedy and ambiguous effects on
Microsoft’s incentives. While the eventual
outcome is uncertain, it is far from clear
that the remedy will reduce industry-wide
innovation. On the contrary, there are
many reasons to believe that it could have
a positive effect on aggregate innovation.
Interoperability at what
price?
Following the Commission’s decision, the
most contentious issue has been the
conditions under which the interoperability
information should be licensed and 
what information was necessary to achieve
full interoperability. The Commission left
the exact conditions out of its initial
decision because it involved intricate review
of technical information, which was
delegated to an independent 
monitoring trustee.
Microsoft’s initial suggestions were
unacceptable to the industry, the
Commission and the independent
monitoring trustee appointed to oversee
the remedy. Microsoft proposed that the
interface information could only be
Competition policy can deter
anti-competitive behaviour
without the need for ever
taking legal action
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purchased as one bundle and specified a
license fee for each rival software copy
shipped in the order of magnitude of the
Microsoft software itself. This would have
clearly continued the exclusionary effect
simply through high prices.
Many industry insiders doubted that
any innovation of significance was
embedded in the interfaces themselves.
They argued that just changing the
language of the interface would not be a
substantive innovation that had material
value and that therefore it should not 
be compensated.
Indeed, to the extent that Microsoft
has innovation embedded in processes
that use the interfaces, such innovations
should not matter for the assessment of
the license fee because the interfaces
themselves do not constitute the
innovation. Typically such information in
other software sectors is licensed at only
nominal fees.
Another contentious issue was the
amount and type of information that
Microsoft had to provide. To interconnect
with Microsoft’s software, rivals needed
information about how exactly the
interface works. When the trustee found
that Microsoft was not giving sufficient
information to make this possible, the
Commission stepped in with a ‘statement
of objection’ and eventually a further large
fine for non-compliance. But this tug-of-
war has led to considerable delay in the
effective implementation of the remedy.
Conclusions
What more general lessons can be learnt
from the Microsoft case about antitrust
enforcement in high-tech markets and
elsewhere? First, it is worth remembering
that the case has gone on for nine years
with four statements of objections issued
and still no final resolution. This is partly a
reflection of the complexity of the
technical issues, the legal necessity of 
due process and Microsoft’s financial
strength. Many of its server rivals have
long since died.
An obvious problem is that the legal
timescale is so long compared with the
rapid evolution of these markets. By the
time a remedy is in place, the marketplace
has moved quickly beyond the problems
over which the case was fought: even if
the judgement and remedy are
appropriate, is it ‘too little too late’? 
In our view, the Commission’s decision on
Microsoft has had some impact since it is
prospective and hence gives the
Commission power over future versions 
of Windows.
Although caution is always warranted
before intervention, antitrust authorities
cannot take a completely laissez faire
approach to innovation markets. Much of
the positive impact of competition policy is
through deterring anti-competitive
behaviour without the need for ever
taking legal action. And since software
markets are replete with examples of
similar issues, the case may have
contributed to higher deterrence against
anti-competitive exclusionary behaviour.
A second observation concerns the
status of foreclosure theory. Part of the
Commission’s case was an explicit
consideration of economic incentives and
an analysis of the effects of the remedy on
innovation. These are clearly important
from an economic perspective, even
though European legal practice is often
ambivalent about getting into these issues.
Despite the difficulty of bringing
empirical evidence to bear, consideration
of innovation and foreclosure was
unavoidable in making a credible
economic case. One of the challenges
facing modern economics is to develop
guidelines for the type of empirical
evidence that could be used to test the
likelihood of foreclosure being a problem
in different markets.
The Commission has been much
criticised in its use of foreclosure theory in
merger cases. For example, the proposed
merger of General Electric and Honeywell
was blocked after it had been cleared by
the US authorities, only for the judgement
(although upheld) to be severely criticised
by the Court of First Instance in 2005.
And in 2002, the Court actually
overturned the Commission’s blocking of
the Tetra/Sidel merger in 2001, which was
based on ‘over-speculative’ theories.
In a sense, foreclosure theory in a
merger case is inherently speculative.
Opponents of the merger must produce
arguments that a particular type of
foreclosure behaviour is more likely to
occur as a result of the merger, although
there are no exclusionary practices in the
pre-merger situation.
The evidential position is better in an
abuse of dominance case because the
exclusionary behaviour is already alleged
to have happened, so there can be an
empirical discussion over whether the
behaviour has in fact occurred, whether it
could be justified in terms of efficiency,
and whether there has been any material
effect on the marketplace as a result of
this behaviour. This was the case with
Microsoft where evaluation was possible.
Furthermore, Microsoft’s exclusionary
mechanisms were lent credibility by the
internal emails, the kind of evidence that
is rarely seen.
Unfortunately, although foreclosure
may be easier to detect in a case over
abuse of monopoly power compared with
a merger, remedying the problem is much
harder. In a merger, there is always the
clear choice of simply blocking the
proposed transaction. Remedies for an
existing monopolist are harder to frame
and even harder to enforce.
The Commission and Microsoft have
been wrangling for a long time over the
terms of the disclosure remedy and it is
still not perceived to be effective.
Microsoft’s main rivals have reached out of
court settlements, so the concern may be
that smaller firms and potential new
entrants could be the main parties to
suffer. We are unlikely to have heard the
end of this case.
This article summarises ‘The Incentives of a
Monopolist to Degrade Interoperability:
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